The January 6th Report Summaries, Part 2
Chapter 5: "A Coup in Search of a Legal Theory"
At this point, Trump was getting desperate. He had lost the election. Lawsuits were rejected. State legislators wouldn’t violate their oaths to the Constitution. The fake electors failed. The DOJ refused to bend to Trump’s will. So Trump’s attention now turned to Pence.
On January 4th, Trump held a meeting with Pence and John Eastman in the Oval Office. Eastman offered Pence two options: 1) reject the certified electors from states Biden won, thus giving the presidency to Trump, or 2) delay the joint session so that state legislators could certify new electors for Trump. However, “Eastman admitted, in front of the president, that both options violated the Electoral Count Act of 1887” (428). Thus, Trump knew this plan was illegal from the beginning, yet he demanded that Pence do it anyway.
Pence rejected Eastman’s plan many times that day and after. He pointed out that he had no power other than to count the certified electoral votes. Rather than back down, Trump ratcheted up his pressure. Trump used rallies and Twitter to lie to his followers by giving them the false impression that Pence had the power to change the election.
As January 6th approached, the Secret Service became aware of the threat of violence against Pence in particular. During his speech at the Ellipse, Trump once again reiterated that Pence was the one who could do something, even though by this point Trump knew Pence had no intention of overturning the election. Trump then ordered the mob to go to the Capitol. He wanted his supporters to intimidate Pence and other Republicans who refused to cave to his demands. Then, after the attack was underway, Trump tweeted that Pence “didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done” (429). It’s no wonder why the mob turned on Pence.
In early 2022, a U.S. District judge evaluated the Trump-Eastman scheme. The judge declared it was “a coup in search of a legal theory” and likely violated at least two federal laws (430).
5.1 President Trump and His Allies Embark on a Desperate Gambit to Block Certification of the 2020 Presidential Election
The formal end of the Trump campaign should have been December 14th, 2020, when the electoral college met to cast votes for the certified winner in each state. But as Trump’s other plans failed, more and more emphasis was placed on subverting the election on January 6th.
On December 13th, Trump lawyer Kenneth Chesebro sent Giuliani a memo outlining the “President of the Senate” strategy. Chesebro argued that Pence — and Pence alone — could choose which electoral college votes to count, even though there was only one legitimate slate of votes from each state. The other slates were from fake electors and thus were not valid.
On December 23rd, Eastman wrote a two-page memo suggesting that Pence could simply not count the electoral college votes from Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. That would give Trump 232 electoral college votes to Biden’s 222. Eastman stressed that Pence should do this “without asking for permission,” since the Constitution makes the Vice President the “ultimate arbiter” (431-432). Another reason Eastman suggested Pence act without asking for permission? Eastman knew that the courts would never find his theory lawful.
That same day Eastman spoke on the phone with Trump for almost 23 minutes.
What’s interesting is that back in October 2020, Eastman had a series of email exchanges with a person named Bruce Colbert. Colbert mentioned to Eastman that Pence could choose which electoral votes to count. At that time, Eastman disagreed with Colbert: “Nowhere does it suggest that the President of the Senate gets to make the determination on his own,” Eastman wrote (432). But by the first week of December, Eastman was now open to this idea.
There are two other parts of Eastman’s December 23rd memo worth mentioning. First, Eastman said Pence could recuse himself from presiding over the joint session, at which point the Senate President Pro Tempore would take over: Republican Senator Chuck Grassley. And second, when either Pence or Grassley got to Arizona’s electoral votes, they should announce the multiplate slates of electors. Eastman figured the two houses would then break for debate, which would end in a stalemate since Republicans controlled the Senate and Democrats controlled the House. This would give state legislators more time to support the fake slates of electors.
In regard to the memo, White House lawyer Eric Herschmann asked Eastman, “are you out of your F’ing mind?” (434). Herschmann was shocked at how unconcerned Eastman was about the public outcry that would happen if they went forward with this plan. Herschmann also asked Eastman if there was any precedent for something like this, to which Eastman said, “No” (434). Other White House lawyers thought Eastman’s plan was “nutty” or “crazy” and had “no validity” (434).
As early as October 26th, Pence’s counsel, Greg Jacob, was also researching the Vice President’s role during the joint session. By December 8th Jacob concluded that Pence had to stick to the Electoral Count Act and that there was nothing that indicated the VP had the power to change the outcome of the election.
Representative Louie Gohmert also pushed Eastman’s theory. On December 27th, Gohmert and several other fake electors from Arizona filed a lawsuit against Pence. This was something Trump approved. In the suit, Gohmert et al. alleged that, because of the competing slates of electors from five states, the court should give Pence the thumbs-up to determine on his own which electoral votes to count and which to reject.
Although this was basically Eastman’s plan, Eastman disagreed with the decision to file the suit. Again, Eastman wanted Pence to act without asking for permission since Eastman knew there was no chance the lawsuit would succeed. Thus, any Federal judge who ruled the scheme to be illegal would effectively put a stop to the plan before they could even try to implement it. In the end, a U.S. district judge rejected Gohmert’s case, and the Supreme Court rejected Gohmert’s appeal.
Other individuals in and close to the Trump White House also pushed Eastman’s theory. John McEntee, the director of the Presidential Personnel Office (who was “not a lawyer and had no relevant experience”), drafted memos echoing Easthman’s plan (439). Jenna Ellis was another advocate. She wrote two memos suggesting that Pence ask to delay certification for ten days, during which time state legislators would reconvene and submit new electoral slates. Ellis also sent these memos to people at Fox News.
5.2 President Trump and His Allies Exert Intense Public and Private Pressure on the Vice President in Advance of the Joint Session of Congress on January 6th
On January 2nd, Pence met with his team to discuss the joint session. By this point Pence had been clear that his role was purely ministerial, but he wanted to draft a short letter on why he didn’t have the authority to change the election results. Pence and his team also discussed allegations of fraud. Pence’s team had done their own evaluation of these claims and found them to be either very small in number or unverifiable.
They also talked about the fake Trump electors. Pence’s team reassured him that those fake slates wouldn’t qualify as alternate slates under the Electoral Count Act, so there were no real competing slates. Pence was worried this might still cause confusion.
Part of the reason Pence was concerned was because earlier that day Eastman was a guest on Steve Bannon’s podcast, War Room: Pandemic. Much of their conversation focused on Pence. Eastman said that Pence had the power to reject the certified electors from any states Biden won, if he chose to do so.
The next day, January 3rd, Eastman wrote a six-page memo with a section called “War Gaming the Alternatives” where he walked through other ways Trump could stay in power (443). All of these options rested on Pence following one of Eastman’s plans for the joint session. Eastman again reiterated the dual slates of electors, although both before and after January 6th he admitted that the fake Trump slates had no legal authority.
On January 4th, Trump met with Pence and Eastman in the Oval Office to try to convince Pence to refuse the certified electors from states Biden won. Noticeably absent from this meeting? White House counsel Pat Cipollone. Cipollone’s deputy, Pat Philbin, had done his own research into this question and concluded that the VP has no power to affect the outcome of the election. Cipollone told Eastman all of this before the Oval Office meeting.
However, during the meeting, Eastman claimed there were two legally viable options: 1) Pence could reject certification from certain states, and 2) Pence could suspend the joint session and send the “disputed” electoral votes back to the states. Eastman admitted to both Trump and Pence that his proposals violated the Electoral Count Act in two ways: Not only were the fake Trump slates not a legitimate set of alternative slates, but also the Electoral Count Act only allows for short delays — nothing long enough to send back to the states. Eastman also acknowledged that even if the slates went back to the states, no state would certify the false Trump slates.
Pence remained resolute not to follow this plan on January 6th. Regardless, Trump continued to publicly pressure Pence, such as at a rally in Georgia that same evening.
The next morning, January 5th, Eastman met with Pence’s staff to ask that Pence take the more aggressive approach and outright reject the electoral votes from states Biden won. At this same time, Trump was tweeting a similar plan.
By the end of the meeting, Eastman again conceded that his plan wouldn’t work. First, one of his examples of precedent didn’t actually prove his point. The example in question was Hawaii’s results after the 1960 election. A Republican slate of electors from Hawaii was originally certified by an outgoing governor, but after a court-ordered recount, it was clear that Kennedy had won the state, not Nixon. The incoming governor then certified a new slate of electors for Kennedy. And when Nixon (as Vice President) arrived at Hawaii during the joint session, he acknowledged Hawaii’s votes for Kennedy. So, if anything, this was an example of a precedent for Pence to comply with the Electoral Count Act.
Eastman also admitted he wouldn’t want any other VP to have this power — say, Kamala Harris in 2025. And finally, Eastman acknowledged that it didn’t make sense for the VP to have that authority because then there would never again be a switch in parties.
While all of this was going on, Pence’s outside counsel turned to help: a conservative former judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, J. Michael Luttig. Luttig is a highly esteemed judge, and Eastman had clerked for him. On the morning of January 5th, Luttig tweeted: “The only responsibility and power of the Vice President under the Constitution is to faithfully count the electoral college votes as they have been cast. The Constitution does not empower the Vice President to alter in any way the votes that have been cast, either by rejecting certain of them or otherwise” (452).
Later on the 5th, Trump summoned Pence to the Oval Office for a one-on-one meeting. The Select Committee doesn’t know what was said in the meeting, but Pence left the meeting even more resolute not to follow Eastman’s plan. Sometime after that, Trump had a phone call with Pence and other lawyers. Pence again reiterated his position.
That evening, The New York Times published an article about Pence and Trump’s meeting the day before. The article mentioned that Pence told Trump that he lacked the power to stop the certification. When Trump heard about the article he was furious and asked to speak with Pence, which he did. Trump then dictated a statement full of lies, most egregiously saying that he and Pence were on the same page about Pence’s options.
Meanwhile, Bannon continued to put pressure on Pence. On the January 5th episode of his podcast, Bannon and his guest openly berated Pence. All of Trump’s allies had the same goal: to overturn the election result, and Pence was their last hope.
5.3 President Trump and His Allies Continue to Pressure the Vice President on January 6th, Threatening His Life and Our Democracy
Pence was clear: He wasn’t going to break the law or his oath to the Constitution.
On the morning of January 6th, starting as early as 1am, Trump sent a series of tweets about how Pence could hand Trump the win. At 11am Trump had a heated phone call with Pence. Ivanka noted that it was a different tone than the one her dad usually used with Pence. At one point Trump called Pence a “wimp” and a “pussy” (457-458).
Trump and his allies used the rally at the Ellipse to apply further pressure on Pence. Giuliani and Eastman both spoke at the Ellipse, and they told the crowd that Pence could “decide on the validity of those crooked ballots” (459). They spread more lies about the election being stolen, and Eastman said the fate of the republic was in Pence’s hands.
When Trump took the stage, he praised Giuliani and Eastman. He called Eastman “one of the most brilliant lawyers in the country” (460). Trump then lied by saying that Pence had the power to change the outcome of the election. Trump also lied when he said several states wanted to recertify their results. The Select Committee notes that Trump’s speech (which was over an hour long and largely improvised), “was a shocking attempt to use public opinion to change the Vice President’s position” (461). Trump then sent the mob to the Capitol.
Shortly before the joint session began at 1pm, Pence released his “Dear Colleague” letter outlining his reason for following the Electoral Count Act. Pence then began the joint session by reading a slightly modified script that has essentially remained unchanged for every certification ceremony. Pence had met with the Senate Parliamentarian on January 3rd to consult with her on the new language. Pence did this because he knew certain Republican members of Congress were going to object to the results, and he wanted to make sure the process followed the rules in the Electoral College Act. So Pence added language about how the parliamentarians had received only one certificate from each state — i.e. that the fake Trump slates weren’t certified and therefore couldn’t be considered a legitimate alternate slate.
At around 1:45pm, Paul Gosar announced he was objecting to Arizona’s electoral ballots. Gosar, by law, needed the signature of a senator willing to endorse his challenge. Ted Cruz had signed an endorsement, so the House and Senate withdrew to their separate chambers to debate and vote on Gosar’s objection. It was at this point that the joint session was delayed due to the insurrection. Later, when the joint session resumed after the attack, six Republican senators and 121 House Republicans voted to reject Arizona’s legitimate electors. The only other state the two chambers debated was Pennsylvania’s, whose objection was endorsed by Josh Hawley.
5.4 President Trump Endangers Pence’s Life, Causing the Vice President, His Family, and Staff to Narrowly Miss the Rioters As They Flee the Mob Attacking the Capitol
Pence was presiding over the Senate’s debate on the Arizona objection when they heard the noise from rioters in the Capitol. At 2:12pm the Secret Service moved Pence from the Senate floor to the Vice President’s ceremonial office. At 2:24pm Trump tweeted that Pence “didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done” (465). The insurrectionists then surged inside and outside the Capitol. The Secret Service realized they couldn’t keep Pence safe in the Capitol, so they moved him, his family, and his staff to a secured location. The mob had come within 40 feet of Pence as he was evacuated.
Since Trump never checked in on Pence, Marc Short, Pence’s chief of staff, called Mark Meadows to tell him they were safe. Later that day Trump asked for Short’s White House credentials to be revoked. Short never spoke with Trump again.
The Secret Service wanted to move Pence from the secured location, but Pence refused to flee and give the rioters a victory. Greg Jacob, one of Pence’s lawyers at the White House, was in the middle of writing an email to Eastman when the Capitol was breached. Just before being evacuated, Jacob wrote: “thanks to your bullshit, we are now under siege” (467). To which Eastman responded: “The ‘siege’ is because YOU and your boss did not do what was necessary to allow this to be aired in a public way so the American people can see for themselves what happened” (467).
The Senate reconvened at around 8pm. Pence gave a short speech about how violence never wins and freedom always wins. They then went back to work.
At 11:44pm, Eastman sent Jacob another email. “In a shockingly tone-deaf manner,” the Committee notes, “Eastman claimed that the Electoral College Act had been violated already, by allowing debate beyond two hours, so — he argued — Vice President Pence should no longer be concerned that what President Trump and Eastman had pressured him to do also would violate it” (468-469). Eastman wanted Pence to adjourn for ten days, something Eastman believed would be a “relatively minor violation” of the Electoral Count Act (469).
5.5 Aftermath of the Attack
The joint session ended in the early morning hours of January 7th.
In the days after, Eastman emailed Giuliani to ask if he (Eastman) could get on the pardon list.
Chapter 6: "Be There, Will Be Wild!"
Trump officially lost the election on December 14th, 2020, when the Electoral College met to cast their votes. But Trump refused to concede. At 1:42am on December 19th, Trump tweeted: “Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild!” (499). Twitter workers testified that this tweet was an RSVP card for Trump’s followers. It led to a slew of calls to overthrow the government.
The Proud Boys immediately took it as a call to arms. They instructed followers to eschew their usual black and yellow attire and instead go incognito on January 6th. On January 4th, Proud Boys leader Henry “Enrique” Tarrio told his followers to storm the Capitol. The Oath Keepers also began to plan for January 6th after Trump’s tweet. Members of both groups have been charged with seditious conspiracy, and some members have admitted that they intended to undermine the certification process.
Other extremists who mobilized after Trump’s tweet include The Three Percenters, Nick Fuentes, QAnon, and Alex Jones. Jones told his viewers that January 6th would be a day of reckoning. One of Jones’ followers, the heiress to the Publix fortune, spent $3 million to pay for the rally at the Ellipse on January 6th. The whole point of the event was to rile up Trump’s supporters. That’s why during his speech Trump told the crowd to “fight like hell. And if you don’t fight like hell, you’re not going to have a country anymore” (502).
6.1 How Far-Right Extremists and Conspiracy Theorists Planned for January 6th
On November 10th, 2020, Ali Alexander, a right-wing provocateur and close associate of political advisor Roger Stone, established the “Stop the Steal” entity. One of Alexander’s key allies was Alex Jones. Jones’ InfoWars hosted “Enrique” Tarrio and Oath Keepers leader Stewart Rhodes multiple times between election day and January 6th. Stone also made frequent appearances on the show.
Alexander, Jones, and others organized rallies across the country to protest supposed voter fraud. At these rallies the Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, Three Percenters, and QAnon began making connections and working together. The Select Committee gathered data on 49 rallies or protests between the election and January 6th. At least nine of these involved entering state capitols, and at least four of them involved people who would participate in the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
Take Atlanta, for example. Between November 18th and 21st, the “Stop the Steal” organizers hosted several rallies outside the state capitol and outside the governor’s mansion. Alexander, Fuentes, and others alluded to storming the Georgia capitol. While the crowd remained peaceful once inside, in many ways this was a dress rehearsal for January 6th. The “Stop the Steal” organizers had gathered various extremist groups together to try to intimidate Georgia lawmakers to overturn the election.
Another rally in Washington, D.C. on December 12th involved more threats of violence. Trump used Twitter to praise the crowd for showing up that day. So when Trump’s December 19th tweet landed, the “Stop the Steal” campaign took what they were already doing and mobilized further. Jones, in particular, urged his followers to show up. “We need martial law and have to prevent the police state of foreigners from taking over. It’s literally in our hands. It’s literally up to us” (506).
6.2 The Proud Boys: “[Y]ou want to storm the Capitol”
The Proud Boys were founded in 2016 with a mission to focus on violence. Tarrio described the Proud Boys like this: “We will kill you. That’s the Proud Boys in a nutshell” (507). During the various Black Lives Matter protests in 2020, the Proud Boys saw themselves as counter-protesters and vigilantes.
During the September 29th, 2020 presidential debate, Trump, rather than denounce right-wing extremists, told the Proud Boys to “Stand back and stand by” (507). The group’s size tripled as a result of this endorsement. The group began selling “stand back and stand by” merchandise that night.
After the election, the Proud Boys became upset that Trump was going to lose. A senior Proud Boy named Joseph Biggs posted to social media: “It’s time for fucking war if they steal this shit” (508). The Proud Boys had the largest showing at several “Stop the Steal” events — often having between 200 and 300 members show up.
One event was in D.C. on December 11th. The next day, members of the Proud Boys tore down a Black Lives Matter banner outside a historically Black church, then filmed themselves burning it. Tarrio was charged with destruction of property and arrested on January 4th, which is why he wasn’t able to attend the insurrection on the 6th.
After Trump’s December 19th tweet, the Proud Boys focused their operation on January 6th. This is what transformed them from a loosely organized group into one that had a well-defined leadership. Tarrio created an encrypted chat group to discuss planning. From the start they were intent on disrupting the electoral count at the Capitol.
Perhaps tellingly, the Proud Boys used the code phrase “storm the winter palace” when discussing plans to storm the Capitol (511). The phrase “storm the winter palace” is a reference to Vladimir Lenin ordering the occupation of the seat of the Russian government. This event was the catalyst for the Communist Revolution. As the Select Committee notes: “No historical event has been less American” (511).
Several Proud Boys who have since pleaded guilty to various charges all testified that the Proud Boys’ plan was to impede the certification of Electoral College votes by any means necessary.
6.3 The Oath Keepers: “He Called Us All to the Capitol and Wants Us to Make It Wild!!!”
The Oath Keepers are a far-right anti-government organization founded in 2009 by Elmer Stewart Rhodes. They target former and enlisted military and law enforcement for recruitment. The Oath Keepers used COVID-lockdown protests as well as “Stop the Steal” events to network.
Rhodes and the Oath Keepers were obsessed with the Insurrection Act. They believed Trump could ask militias like the Oath Keepers to enforce the law. The Oath Keepers were willing and able to fight to keep Trump in office.
6.4 “Trump Said It’s Gonna Be Wild!!!!!!! It’s Gonna Be Wild!!!!!!!”
Trump’s December 19th tweet helped to forge an alliance between the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers — two groups who looked upon the other with disdain. (As explained in the endnotes, the Oath Keepers thought the Proud Boys were extreme white supremacists, while the Proud Boys thought the Oath Keepers were “oath breakers” and embarrassing [553].) The two groups worked together to coordinate plans.
Meanwhile, Rhodes and other Oath Keepers made plans of their own. They used encrypted chats on Signal as well as video meetings to plan for violence on the 6th. They established two Quick Reaction Forces in Virginia just outside of D.C. where they could store a cache of weapons. This included military-style assault weapons and other firearms. Rhodes alone spent over $20,000 in firearms and accessories.
6.5 “Ready to Step in and Do What Is Needed”
On the evening of January 5th, the Oath Keepers schmoozed with other far-right activists and politicians, including Virginia state senator Amanda Chase. Later that night, Rhodes and the Oath Keepers’ lawyer, Kellye SoRelle, met with Proud Boys leader “Enrique” Tarrio in a parking garage in the D.C. area. As mentioned earlier, Tarrio was arrested on January 4th and was banned from being in D.C. Rather than leave D.C. immediately after his release, Tarrio met with Rhodes and SoRelle.
Documentary filmmaker Nick Quested was following the Proud Boys leading up to January 6th, but Tarrio asked Quested’s crew to stop filming during this meeting, so the Select Committee doesn’t know everything discussed. Regardless, it was clearly a unified front between the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers. It also largely appeared to be a tactical conversation regarding the 6th. After the meeting, Tarrio went to Baltimore, where he remained for the events of the 6th.
6.6 “Friends of Stone”
The nexus between the Proud Boys and the Oath Keepers was Roger Stone, a right-wing political operative and one of Trump’s oldest political advisors. At least seven members of the Oath Keepers provided security for Stone on January 6th and the days prior. As for the Proud Boys, Stone has taken the Proud Boys oath and has a close relationship with Tarrio.
Stone communicated with the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers through a Signal chat group called F.O.S. — Friends of Stone. Two days after the election, Stone sent the group this message: “We provide information several times a day. So please monitor the F.O.S. feed so you can act in a timely fashion” (519).
On December 23, 2020, Trump pardoned Stone after he was convicted of lying to Congress. When the Select Committee questioned Stone, he invoked his Fifth Amendment privileges almost 90 times.
6.7 White Nationalists: “The Capitol Siege Was Fucking Awesome”
Nick Fuentes leads a white nationalist movement called “America First” or the “Groypers.” Fuentes gained traction after the 2017 “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville. He went to the U.S. Capitol on January 6th and incited his followers as the attack was underway.
Between November 3rd and January 19th, Fuentes used his livestreams to earn at least $50,000 by spreading the Big Lie. He was also a prominent member of the “Stop the Steal” rallies, encouraging his followers to “storm every State capitol until January 20, 2021, until President Trump is inaugurated for 4 more years” (520). On January 4th, Fuentes “jokingly” suggested that his listeners kill state legislators who didn’t support efforts to overturn the 2020 election.
We’ll learn more in Chapter 8, but the Groypers played a role in the January 6th attack as well. The next day, Fuentes tweeted: “The Capitol Siege was fucking awesome and I’m not going to pretend it wasn’t” (521). Fuentes also exercised his Fifth Amendment rights when questioned by the Select Committee.
6.8 The Three (III%) Percenters: “#OccupyCongress”
Another anti-government extremist group inspired to act after Trump’s December 19th tweet was the Three Percenters. Here’s what the Select Committee has to say about them: “The Three Percenters believe that three percent of American colonists successfully overthrew the British during the American Revolution. This is not true. Far more than a tiny fraction of the colonial population fought in or supported the Revolutionary War. Regardless, this ahistorical belief has become an organizing myth for militias around modern-day America” (521). The Three Percenters equate our U.S. Government with the British monarchy. The Big Lie played into the Three Percenters’ distrust of government, so they immediately began planning for violence after Trump’s tweet.
One of the Three Percenters’ leaders from north Texas tried to post two banners on Facebook to advertise January 6th. Both banners had the hashtag “OccupyCongress” and referenced “The Great Betrayal” (522). Three Percenters groups in Florida and California advertised and promoted violence leading up to January 6th. There is also evidence that Three Percenters coordinated with the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers.
6.9 QAnon: “Operation Occupy the Capitol”
QAnon is “a bizarre and dangerous cult” that became popular in 2017 (525). QAnon followers believe that Trump is fighting forces of the “deep state” and a Satanic pedophile ring operated by Democrats. Although Q’s prophecies have been wrong, the conspiracy has evolved and grown over time.
QAnon played a large role in spreading election conspiracy theories, especially in regard to Dominion voting machines. QAnon followers saw the “will be wild!” tweet as a call to arms and flocked to Washington, D.C. QAnon message boards were full of violent discussions as January 6th drew near.
6.10 TheDonald.win: “Occupy the Capitol”
TheDonald.win started as a Reddit forum with almost 800,000 ardent fans of Trump. In 2020 the group got banned from Reddit and moved to its new location: TheDonald.win. Dan Scavino, Trump’s social media director, often monitored and amplified content from TheDonald.win. (Scavino refused to cooperate with the Select Committee’s subpoena.)
After the December 19th tweet, users on the site posted maps of the U.S. Capitol, one of which indicated where the Capitol Access Tunnels are located. Other posts encouraged followers to bring handcuffs and zip ties in order to make citizen’s arrests. One user suggested: “Let’s construct a Gallows outside the Capitol building next Wednesday so the Congressmen watching from their office windows shit their pants” (529). Trump campaign senior advisor Jason Miller texted Mark Meadows on December 30th to brag: “I got the base FIRED UP,” and then sent a link to TheDonald.win (529).
6.11 How the White House and Rally Organizers Prepared for January 6th
Hours after Trump’s December 19th tweet, Cindy Chafian, an executive at Women for America First (WFAF), emailed the National Park Service to move an event that had been planned to coincide with Biden’s inauguration to January 6th. Once their permit was revised, WFAF hosted Trump at the Ellipse on the morning of January 6th.
WFAF was founded in 2019 by a mother-and-daughter pair who supported Trump. WFAF also played a prominent role in the “Stop the Steal” movement.
Meanwhile, “Stop the Steal” founder Ali Alexander had his team register and launch a new website: www.WildProtest.com. Other groups that organized events or rallies on January 5th or 6th included the self-proclaimed “Judeo-Christian” Jericho March organization, Virginia Freedom Keepers (a vaccine-skeptic group), Latinas for Trump, and Moms for America (530).
6.12 “He’s Calling on You, He Needs Your Help”
As mentioned earlier, Alex Jones was one of the loudest supporters of the “Stop the Steal” movement. Jones’ staff worked with Chafian and WFAF to bring people to D.C. on January 6th. Jones’ broadcasts also helped raise funding for the event at the Ellipse.
Julie Fancelli, the billionaire heiress to the Publix fortune, is a Trump supporter. After listening to Jones’ December 20th show, Fancelli worked with a Trump campaign fundraiser to create a $3 million budget to “get as many people there [i.e. D.C.] as possible” (532). This included $500,000 to bus people in, and another $500,000 to help WFAF and Jones organize the event.
6.13 “Trump Is Supposed to Order Us to the Capitol”
On December 27th, Trump tweeted again about the 6th: “See you in Washington, D.C., on January 6th. Don’t miss it. Information to follow!” (532). That same evening, Trump had dinner with Don Jr. and his girlfriend, Kimberly Guilfoyle. During the meal, Guilfoyle spoke with one of the January 6th rally organizers. This led to the White House having a more direct role with regard to the Ellipse rally, particularly in terms of planning to ask the crowd to march to the Capitol.
On January 4th, one of WFAF’s founders emailed MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell to confirm Trump was going to ask his followers to march to the Capitol, but she emphasized that the plan “stays only between us” (533).
6.14 “Well, I Should Walk with the People”
On January 4th, Trump said he wanted to march with his supporters to the Capitol on January 6th. Although his advisors shot down that idea, Trump didn’t give up on the plan. (More to come in Chapter 7.)
6.15 “POTUS… Likes the Crazies”
Katrina Pierson was one of the Ellipse rally organizers. As the 6th approached, “Stop the Steal” personalities Ali Alexander, Alex Jones, and Roger Stone all wanted to speak, but Pierson was wary. As Pierson put it in a text to one of the WFAF founders: “”POTUS… likes the crazies” (535). She called the lineup of Stone, Jones, and Alexander the “psycho list” (535).
In the end, Stone, Jones, and Alexander didn’t end up speaking at the Ellipse on January 6th. However, John Eastman and Giuliani did speak at the Ellipse, and they used their speeches to promote false claims of voter fraud.
6.16 January 5, 2021: “Fort Trump”
Although the “Stop the Steal” coalition didn’t speak at the Ellipse, they did use their platforms to rile up the crowds in D.C. the day before. Alexander spoke in front of the U.S. Capitol at an event sponsored by Moms for America. Jones and Stone spoke in front of the Supreme Court at an event hosted by Virginia Women for Trump. Stone said: “This is a fight for the future of the United States of America. It is a fight for the future of Western Civilization as we know it. It’s a fight between dark and light… And we dare not fail, or we will step out into one thousand years of darkness” (537).
All three men also spoke at Freedom Plaza the evening of the 5th, as did Michael Flynn. All four of them riled up the crowd.
6.17 “Together, We Will Stop the Steal”
Meanwhile, Trump was in the Oval Office, listening to the music and cheering from the crowd at Freedom Plaza. Trump reiterated that he wanted to march with the crowd to the Capitol the next day. He even asked for the best route to take.
During his speech at the Ellipse the next morning, Trump riled up the crowd that he knew was armed. As the Select Committee notes, “the word ‘fight,’ or a variation thereof, appeared only twice in the prepared text. President Trump would go on to utter the word twenty times” (540).
Chapter 7: 187 Minutes of Dereliction
Trump finished his speech at the Ellipse at 1:10pm. By then the attack on the Capitol had already begun, but it would quickly escalate. Trump was aware of the attack by 1:21pm. He didn’t do anything to try to stop it until 4:17pm when he tweeted a video message telling his followers to go home. Those 187 minutes amount to a willful or negligent failing of duty. Trump was the best person to do something that day, but he chose to sit back and watch it all unfold. Even worse, Trump added fuel to the fire by tweeting at 2:24pm that Pence lacked the courage to act.
Behind the scenes, Pence was making the kind of calls Trump should have been making. At the White House, advisors begged Trump to act sooner. At 2:38pm Trump tweeted: “Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They are truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful!” (579). Trump resisted using the word “peaceful,” but he added “Stay peaceful!” after Ivanka suggested it. Don Jr. also recognized this tweet wasn’t enough. Kevin McCarthy and a couple Fox News hosts also urged Trump to do more, but he refused.
At the end of the 4:17pm video message, after finally telling the rioters to go home, Trump said: “So go home. We love you. You’re very special” (580). The next day, Trump struggled to deliver proposed remarks denouncing the attack. He wanted to pardon the rioters, but the White House counsel objected, so the language wasn’t included.
7.1 “Reinsert the Mike Pence Lines”
On the morning of January 6th, Trump tweeted three times: First to repeat a false claim of election fraud, then to pressure Pence into delaying the electoral count, and third to urge Republican allies in Congress to do the same. Trump also spoke on the phone with Steve Bannon and Rudy Giuliani. One person Trump couldn’t reach? Mike Pence.
Trump also worked with his speechwriter, Stephen Miller, to finalize his speech at the Ellipse. None of the previous drafts mentioned Pence, but Trump added the following lines: “Today, we will see whether Republicans stand strong for the integrity of our elections. And we will see whether Mike Pence enters history as a truly great and courageous leader. All he has to do is refer the illegally-submitted electoral votes back to the states that were given false and fraudulent information where they want to recertify. With only 3 of the 7 states in question we win” (581-582).
White House lawyer and senior advisor Eric Herschmann asked the person loading the teleprompter to remove the lines about Pence. But after the 11:17am call between Trump and Pence (the one where Trump called Pence a pussy), Miller requested the Pence lines get reinserted into the speech. When it came time for the speech, Trump directed his anger at Pence, often ad-libbing lines not in the text.
7.2 “I’ll Be There with You”
At the Ellipse, about half the crowd (around 25,000 people) refused to pass through the magnetometers (metal detectors) because their weapons would then be confiscated by the Secret Service. Trump was furious. He shouted at his team: “I don’t [fucking] care that they have weapons. They’re not here to hurt me. Take the [fucking] mags away. Let my people in. They can march to the Capitol from here. Take the [fucking] mags away” (585).
Trump took to the stage around noon. He spent most of his time attacking Pence and Republican members of Congress, then telling the crowd they needed to fight. Trump mentioned that he would walk with the crowd to the Capitol. However, the Secret Service wouldn’t be able to ensure his safety, especially since violence had already erupted at the Capitol, so they didn’t allow him to march.
7.3 The President’s Anger When He Could Not March to the Capitol
The Select Committee was concerned that Trump actually intended to march to the Capitol, as that would be indicative of an effort to overturn the election either inside the Chamber or outside the Capitol. In his book, Mark Meadows claims Trump was always speaking metaphorically, but Trump’s furious reaction when he found out he couldn’t march with the crowd would seem to indicate otherwise. Also, the Committee spoke with many White House witnesses who confirmed that Trump wanted to go to the Capitol on January 6th.
Multiple witnesses corroborated Trump’s reaction in the President’s vehicle when he was told he couldn’t march to the Capitol: He became very angry, asking why he couldn’t go. Trump then may or may not have lunged at the head of his security detail and/or the driver in an effort to force them to go to the Capitol. There were several different accounts of what happened, so the Committee doesn’t know for sure.
Either way, it’s clear that Trump was angry and that he continued to push to go to the Capitol, even after returning to the White House.
7.4 “We’re Going to Try to Get the President to Put Out a Statement”
When Trump returned to the White House, a staffer informed him there was a riot at the Capitol. This was at 1:21pm. Trump went to the Presidential Dining Room to watch TV and drink Diet Coke. He stayed in the dining room until 6:27pm, only leaving from 4:03pm to 4:07pm to film his video message from the Rose Garden.
From an official standpoint, the time from 1:10pm to 4:17pm is undocumented. The President’s Daily Diary is “inexplicably blank” during that time (593). When the Select Committee questioned the officials in charge of the diary, they had no credible explanation for the gap. One person said, “I don’t recall a specific reason” why the diary is blank (593). Mark Meadows and Dan Scavino, the two people who spent the most time with Trump that day, refused to comply with the Select Committee’s subpoenas. Others in the room cited executive privilege. The official White House photographer was also turned away because Trump didn’t want any photos. Finally, “others who worked just outside of the Oval Office, like the President’s personal secretaries Molly Michael and Austin Ferrer Piran Basualdo, claimed not to remember nearly anything from one of the most memorable days in recent American history” (593).
There’s an amusing exchange with Basualdo in the endnotes on page 621:
Basualdo: I don’t remember where I was that afternoon.
Questioner: Do you remember being at the White House that afternoon, even if you don’t remember where exactly you were in the White House?
Basualdo: No, I do not.
Questioner: Do you remember being home, wherever home is for you, on the afternoon of January 6, as opposed to being at the White House?
Basualdo: No, I don’t.
Questioner: So you don’t remember whether you were at home or at the White House in the afternoon of January 6, 2021?
Basualdo: Again, that day was very blurry.
Even though the official records are blank, here’s what the Select Committee knows: Trump watched the events unfold on Fox News. He tweeted a few times. He made a few phone calls, some to Giuliani and some to members of Congress to get them to continue their objection to the electoral certification.
And here’s what the Select Committee knows Trump didn’t do: He didn’t call any kind of law enforcement agency to ask them to stop the insurrectionists. He refused to tell the mob to go home.
Shortly after arriving in the dining room, White House Press Secretary Kayleigh McEnany checked in with Trump. He once again brought up the idea of going to the Capitol. Trump was also eager to know which senators were making objections. (The Select Committee subpoenaed several members of Congress whom Trump called that day, but none of them complied.) Meanwhile, Trump’s team was already starting to push him to release a statement.
7.5 “He Doesn’t Want to Do Anything”
Throughout the afternoon, Trump’s advisors tried to get him to release a statement, but to no avail. By 2:13pm rioters had broken into the Capitol. Shortly thereafter, Pat Cipollone burst into Mark Meadows’ office to get Trump to do something. Meadows replied, “He doesn’t want to do anything, Pat” (595).
7.6 “He Thinks Mike Deserves It”
At 2:24pm Trump tweeted his first public statement during the attack. This was the “Mike Pence didn’t have the courage to do what should have been done” tweet (596). Cassidy Hutchinson, an aide to Meadows, heard Meadows and Cipollone speaking after meeting with Trump. Cipollone said Trump needed to do more. All Meadows could say was, “You heard him, Pat. He thinks Mike deserves it. He doesn’t think they’re doing anything wrong” (596).
7.7 “I Guess They’re Just More Upset about the Election Theft Than You Are”
Right after sending his tweet about Pence, Trump called Senator Tommy Tuberville of Alabama. Trump wanted to talk about objecting to the electoral count, but Tuberville was trapped in the building and said he couldn’t talk.
Trump also called Kevin McCarthy. McCarthy urged Trump to say or do something. Trump claimed the rioters were Antifa, but McCarthy confirmed they were Trump’s people, to which Trump said, “Well, Kevin, I guess they’re just more upset about the election theft than you are” (598).
7.8 “Stay Peaceful!”
Since no one was getting through to Trump, Eric Herschmann went to get Ivanka and brought her to the dining room. At 2:38pm Trump tweeted: “Please support our Capitol Police and Law Enforcement. They are truly on the side of our Country. Stay peaceful!” (599).
After getting back to her office, McEnany told her deputy that Trump didn’t want to mention peace at all in his tweet, but he finally agreed when Ivanka suggested the phrase “Stay peaceful.” Ivanka repeatedly met with her dad that day, and each time she thought she was getting through to him, yet Trump refused to do anything.
7.9 “The President Needs to Stop This ASAP”
Trump’s 2:38pm tweet didn’t tell the rioters to leave. At 2:44pm a Capitol police officer shot and killed Ashli Babbitt. Trump was told of this, and he continued to refuse to act. Meanwhile, Meadows was inundated with texts to urge Trump to do more, including from Marjorie Talor Greene, Laura Ingraham, and Don, Jr.
At 3:13pm Trump tweeted: “I am asking for everyone at the U.S. Capitol to remain peaceful. No violence! Remember, WE are the Party of Law & Order — respect the Law and our great men and women in Blue. Thank you!” (603). Again, this didn’t tell the mob to leave.
7.10 “We Love You. You’re Very Special”
By 3:17pm, Fox News was reporting on gunshots at the Capitol. Meadows continued to receive a slew of texts begging Trump to tell the rioters to go home. Some of these texts came from Sean Hannity, Brian Kilmeade, and Don, Jr. (again!).
It would have been very easy for Trump to go down the hallway to the White House Press Briefing Room and issue a statement. However, it wasn’t until almost three hours after the violence began that Trump finally told the mob to go home. By that point more law enforcement had arrived at the Capitol to quell the insurrection.
When it came time to record his message in the Rose Garden, Trump didn’t stick to the script. Trump instead claimed the election was stolen. He ended by saying: “So go home, we love you. You’re very special. You’ve seen what happens. You see the way others are treated that are so bad and so evil. I know how you feel, but go home and go home in peace” (606). Once Trump’s followers saw the message, they began to disperse.
7.11 “Remember This Day Forever!”
At 6:11pm Trump tweeted the last time that day: “These are the things and events that happen when a sacred landslide election victory is so unceremoniously & viciously stripped away from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for so long. Go home with love & in peace. Remember this day forever!” (607).
Then Trump retired to his residence. Before parting with one of his aides, Trump said: “Mike Pence let me down” (607).
7.12 President Trump Still Sought to Delay the Joint Session
After Trump released his video message, Giuliani called the White House ten times before he finally got in touch with Trump. After their conversation, Giuliani called several members of Congress, including Jim Jordan, Lindsay Graham, Josh Hawley, and Ted Cruz. Giuliani was trying to get these Republicans to further delay or object to the counting of the electoral votes.
Trump also made multiple phone calls that evening, but no one he spoke with complied with their subpoena or agreed to answer questions. 12 of the calls were before Pence reopened the joint session at 8:06pm. Trump also spoke with members of his communications team that night, including Scavino, McEnany, Jason Miller, and Sean Hannity.
7.13 He “Just Didn’t Want to Talk about It Anymore”
Trump didn’t express any grief or regret for what happened at the Capitol. He never called Pence — either that night or at any point that day. Two days later, Trump was over it. He told his press aides that he “just didn’t want to talk about it more. [H]e was tired of talking about it” (611).
7.14 President Trump’s “Rhetoric Killed Someone”
Although Trump never expressed regret, some on his team did. On the evening of the 6th, Brad Parscale, Trump’s former campaign manager, texted the Ellipse rally organizer Katrina Pierson. He said he felt guilty for helping Trump win, and that Trump’s rhetoric had killed someone. Pierson texted back, “It wasn’t the rhetoric,” to which Parscale responded, “Yes it was” (612).
Chapter 8: Analysis of the Attack
The DOJ has found that “Enrique” Tarrio and the Proud Boys conspired to “prevent, hinder and delay the certification of the Electoral College vote” (637). Even though Tarrio wasn’t at the Capitol on January 6th, he cheered on his men with encrypted messages like “Do what must be done” and “Don’t fucking leave” (637). The Select Committee’s analysis of the evidence corroborates the DOJ’s findings.
While Trump’s followers were gathered at the Ellipse on the morning of January 6th, Proud Boys were already at the Capitol preparing the attack. They initiated their assault shortly before the joint session of Congress began at 1pm. Throughout the attack, Proud Boys led pushes at key breach points.
As mentioned in Chapter 6, other far-right extremists and conspiracy groups also prepared for violence. Thus, the attack on the Capitol wasn’t a riot — it was an insurrection.
8.1 The Mob Assembles in Washington
On the morning of January 6th, Trump’s followers gathered at the Ellipse. Documentarian Nick Quested captured footage of Jacob Chansley (a.k.a. The QAnon Shaman) saying “this is our 1776” (639).
The Secret Service had set up metal detectors to screen for weapons and other contraband. About 28,000 rally-goers went through the metal detectors, and the Secret Service confiscated “269 knives or blades, 242 canisters of peppery spray, 18 brass knuckles, 18 tasers, 6 pieces of body armor, 3 gas masks, 30 batons or blunt instruments, and 17 miscellaneous items like scissors, needles, or screwdrivers” (640). By 8:07am, the Secret Service noted people in the crowd wearing ballistic helmets and body armor. The crowd was clearly itching for a fight.
After a National Park Service officer arrested a man who entered a restricted area around the Washington Monument, a crowd of 100 people formed a circle around the officer and threatened him. The officer and man in custody retreated into the Washington Monument, but the crowd punched the Monument’s glass windows and continued to threaten the officer.
Other rally-goers were openly brandishing AR-15s and other guns. As previously discussed, the Oath Keepers kept a “quick reaction force” across the D.C. border in Virginia which had a stash of firearms they could use to stop the certification (641). Other insurrectionists used axes, hockey sticks, or flagpoles as weapons.
8.2 March of the Proud Boys
While most of Trump’s supporters gathered at the Ellipse, 200-300 members of the Proud Boys met at the Washington Monument to march to the Capitol. With Tarrio in Baltimore (but monitoring events closely), three senior members led the group on the 6th: Ethan Nordean, Joseph Biggs, and Zachary Rehl. Nordean came from Seattle, WA and was considered the leader for January 6th after Tarrio’s arrest. Biggs was an event organizer for the Proud Boys who once worked for Alex Jones and InfoWars. Rehl was president of a Philadelphia chapter and raised more than $5,500 in funds for January 6th.
The Proud Boys arrived at the Capitol a little after 11am. They circled the Capitol and then had lunch at food trucks around noon. By 12:50pm they had returned to the Peace Circle fence outside the Capitol.
8.3 The Initial Attack
When the 200-300 Proud Boys arrived at the Peace Circle, they began their attack. This was a strategic location, because when Trump urged his followers to march to the Capitol, the shortest route from the Ellipse would take them to the Peace Circle. By the time rally-goers arrived, the Proud Boys had already removed the fencing in the crowd’s way, which led thousands of people to access the Capitol’s restricted grounds.
Rioters at Garfield Circle, which is parallel to the Peace Circle, also breached fencing. These two groups met and coalesced on the Capitol grounds at the West Plaza, the area that held the inauguration stage for the upcoming inauguration. Officers were able to hold the line at the inauguration stage, but they would soon lose it once Trump supporters arrived from the Ellipse.
8.4 President Trump’s Mob Descends on the U.S. Capitol
As Trump ended his speech, he encouraged his followers to march to the Capitol and “fight like hell” (647). The Select Committee then quotes several insurrectionists who pleaded guilty or were charged with felonies for their behavior on the 6th. A small sampling: Cody Mattice, who said, “We’re getting ready to go march on Capitol Hill. We’re gonna go fuck some shit up” (647). Then, outside the Capitol, Mattice said, “We’re getting up front, and we’re taking this shit” (647). Ryan Nichols, while marching to the Capitol, said, “I’m hearing that Pence just caved… I’m telling you, if Pence caved, we’re gonna drag motherfuckers through the streets” (647).
“Stop the Steal” leaders also continued to rile up the crowd. Alex Jones and Ali Alexander led crowds to the Capitol from the Ellipse. Jones used a bullhorn to gather more people to march, saying this was “the second American revolution” (649). Text records show that Jones and other InfoWar crew were in touch with members of the Proud Boys numerous times that day. “Jones has repeatedly claimed that he tried to calm the crowd,” the Select Committee notes, “but his actions also coincided with two police line breaches and one breach of the Capitol building itself” (650).
Around 2pm, shortly after Jones arrived at the newly established police line, rioters breached the line and made their way up the stairs to the Rotunda Doors.
8.5 The Mob Surges
Guy Reffitt, a member of the Three Percenters, was the first to advance on the new police line. That morning he had posted to social media: “I’m taking the Capitol with everybody fucking else… We’re all going to drag them mother fuckers out kicking and screaming… I just want to see Pelosi’s head hit every fucking stair on the way out” (652).
Meanwhile, Daniel Scott, a member of the Proud Boys, led the charge up the scaffolding stairs used to construct the inaugural stage. Both of these surges opened paths for more insurrectionists to storm the Capitol.
8.6 The United States Capitol Is Breached
Over the next hour, insurrectionists breached the Capitol at several locations, spurred on by Trump.
A Proud Boy named Dominic Pezzola was the first person to breach the Capitol building when he used a stolen riot shield to smash a window on the Senate wing at 2:13pm. Minutes later the intruders pushed open other doors from the inside, which allowed more members of the mob to enter the Capitol — mostly white supremacists and Confederate sympathizers. In fact, this was the first time in U.S. history that a member of an insurrection ever carried a Confederate flag inside the Capitol. Some of these intruders broke into Pelosi’s office and stole a laptop. Others confronted Capitol police officers, saying things like “Where are they counting the votes?” or “This is our America!” (655).
Law enforcement was able to regain control of the Senate wing doors at 2:43pm, but five minutes later the insurrectionists breached the door once again. As the Select Committee notes: “The second breach was one of the most violent breaches of the day, with the mob forcefully pushing law enforcement backwards until the pathway was clear for them to enter” (656).
While all of that was going on in the Senate wing, another group of Proud Boys led an attack on the security barriers at the East Plaza. At 2:06pm the mob broke through the barriers and charged a set of doors outside the Rotunda. Again, this happened just minutes after Alex Jones arrived. After leading the mob in chants of “1776,” one of Jones’ security guards told him that he (Jones) would likely get blamed for all of this. Shortly thereafter, as insurrectionists poured into the Rotunda, Jones and Ali Alexander left the Capitol area altogether.
Capitol police held the line at the Rotunda, but only for another ten minutes. Then, two Proud Boys breached the doors once again. The Oath Keepers also formed “stacks” — a military-style formation where each person places their hand on the shoulder of the person in front of them, creating a kind of human wall. These stacks led to breaches in the Rotunda area as well. As the insurrectionists advanced inside the Capitol, they made their way to the House Chamber.
At each of these breach points, insurrectionists violently struck officers and shouted things like “This is my fucking Capitol. This is not yours. This is my building” (658).
8.7 President Trump Pours Fuel on the Fire
At 2:24pm Trump poured fuel on the fire by tweeting that Pence lacked the courage to change the election results. One minute later, the mob pushed through the police line in the Capitol to make their way to the House Chamber. Ten minutes later, insurrectionists also made their way into the Senate Chamber. Jacob Chansley (a.k.a. The QAnon Shaman) went to the Senate dais where Pence had been presiding over the joint session and shouted: “Mike Pence is a fucking traitor!” (661). He also left a note that read: “It’s Only a Matter of Time. Justice is Coming!” (661).
Meanwhile, outside the Capitol, Nick Fuentes fired up the mob with the news from Trump’s tweet. The mob then took over the inauguration stage in the West Plaza. Members of the mob “struck officers with weapons, shot them with OC (or pepper) spray, and dragged officers from the tunnel into the crowd” (662).
8.8 The Evacuation
The Senate and House had already split by the time the insurrectionists made their way inside the Capitol. Pence was escorted off the Senate floor at 2:12pm and taken to a secure location by 2:30pm, at which point the Senators were also evacuated. On the House side, Pelosi was also escorted away at 2:12pm. Ten minutes later, she was taken to an undisclosed location. By 2:38pm members of the House began their evacuation. This was when Ashli Babbitt tried to climb through a shattered glass door and was shot and killed.
8.9 Clearing the U.S. Capitol Building and Restricted Grounds
Once members of Congress were safe, law enforcement spent about three hours pushing insurrectionists out of the Capitol. Once the mob was out of the building, officers began to push the mob further and further back. By 7pm Pence returned to the Capitol, and the joint session resumed shortly after 8pm. At 3:32am on January 7th, Congress completed the certification of Biden as the 46th President of the United States.
Recommendations
Based off their findings, the Select Committee offers 11 recommendations for future action:
1. Electoral Count Act. The Senate should pass H.R. 8873, “The Presidential Election Reform Act,” to reaffirm that the Vice President has no authority to reject official electoral slates, as well as to clarify that the process of selecting electoral college electors can’t be changed retroactively after an election is over.
2. Accountability. It’s up to the DOJ to determine whether they’ll prosecute anyone involved in the events surrounding January 6th. At the very least, attorneys should not use their law licenses to undermine the peaceful transfer of power.
3. Violent Extremism. The Secret Service and other federal intelligence agencies should combat the threat of extremism from white nationalists and anti-government groups. They should also share their information with one another to better combat these threats.
4. Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3. The Select Committee has referred Trump and others for “assisting and providing aid and comfort to an insurrection” (690). Also, Congressional committees should evaluate whether to ban those people from holding future office based on Section 3 of the 14th Amendment. (I’ve written before about Section 3 of the 14th Amendment. For more info, see this post.)
5. National Special Security Event. Moving forward, the joint session of Congress to certify electoral votes should be designated as a National Special Security Event, which means it would receive the same kind of special security and advanced planning as the State of the Union or the inauguration.
6. To the extent needed, consider reforming certain criminal statutes, including to add more severe penalties. Congress should update statues (such as 18 U.S.C. Section 1512[c]2) to make efforts like Trump’s a clear violation of those codes, just in case other authorities (i.e. the Supreme Court) reach a different conclusion.
7. House of Representatives Civil Subpoena Enforcement Authority. Congressional committees should find ways for the House of Representatives to better enforce its subpoenas so people can’t just ignore them.
8. Threats to Election Workers. Congressional committees should strengthen federal penalties for threats against election workers.
9. Capitol Police Oversight. Congressional committees should work with Capitol police to improve its training and practices so as to better protect against and prevent events like January 6th.
10. Role of the Media. Since many individuals who were involved in January 6th were provoked to action by false information, Congressional committees should evaluate policies used by media companies to radicalize their audience.
11. Discussion of the Insurrection Act. Congressional committees should reevaluate the Insurrection Act in light of Trump’s possible use of it, as well as its possible risk for future elections.
Appendix 1: Government Agency Preparation for and Response to January 6th
Prior to January 6th, several government agencies were aware of the potential for violence on the 6th. This included info about specific planning by the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers. There was no evidence that Antifa or other left-wing groups would engage in violent behavior. Although few in law enforcement could predict the full extent of the violence at the Capitol, the Secret Service and the National Security Council knew enough that Trump or others at the White House should have canceled the Ellipse rally and Trump’s plans to have his followers march to the Capitol.
After Trump’s December 19, 2020 “Be there, will be wild!” tweet, an analyst at the National Capital Region Threat Intelligence Consortium “noticed a tenfold uptick in violent online rhetoric targeting Congress and law enforcement” (694). By December 30th, the Secret Service was aware of Trump supporters’ plans to storm the Capitol. Capitol police were aware of these plans a day later. The FBI and Department of Homeland Security were also aware of the online discussions in regard to the Capitol.
The Secret Service even received a tip about the Proud Boys that said: “Their plan is to literally kill people… Please please take this tip seriously and investigate further” (695). The Capitol police received a tip from someone who had been tracking far-right extremism for years. She wrote: “January 6th will be the day most of these people realize there’s no chance left for Trump. They’ll be pushed to what they feel is the edge” (695). This person also noted that the Trump supporters would be armed and that for the first time she felt “truly worried” (695).
As the 6th approached, intelligence and law enforcement agencies gathered links to social media posts that indicated terrorism-like behavior. Thus, both federal and and local agencies agreed there was a potential for violence on the 6th from Trump supporters.
Preparing for January 6th required coordination among federal and local law enforcement agencies, such as the National Guard, the D.C. Police Department, and the Capitol police. A January 4th inter-agency call helped various agencies understand what their responsibilities were. The Department of Defense was seen as the quarterback making the calls.
The morning of the 6th was calm, and it felt like there were adequate precautions in place. However, no one would have predicted Trump’s actions that day. Aside from everything at the Capitol, there was a pipe bomb near the Republican National Committee’s headquarters, a truck with guns and Molotov cocktails parked near the Capitol, and an explosive device at the Democratic National Headquarters, where Vice President-elect Harris was inside.
The violence at the Capitol escalated faster than anyone anticipated. The D.C. Police Department called it a riot as early as 1:49pm. At 2:29pm (five minutes after Trump’s tweet about Pence), the D.C. PD commander transmitted a message about losing the line at the western part of the Capitol and requesting emergency assistance. The mayor of D.C. also spoke with the governors of Maryland and Virginia to receive additional National Guard support.
All in all, around 250 officers were injured, 114 of whom were Capitol officers. Five officers died in the following days. Finally, as the Select Committee notes, “while the danger to the Capitol posted by an armed and angry crowd was foreseeable, the fact that the President of the United States would be the catalyst of their fury and facilitate the attack was unprecedented in American history” (711).
Appendix 2: D.C. National Guard Prepration for and Response to January 6th
Unlike the National Guard units in the 50 states and three territories, all of which are under the command of each governor, the D.C. National Guard is under the command of the President.
As mentioned earlier, there was a tenfold increase in violent rhetoric after Trump’s “Be there, will be wild!” tweet. At first, people at the DOJ who helped command deployment of the National Guard were skeptical of the need for the D.C. National Guard on the 6th. Part of the hesitation was due to the optics of having troops so close to the site of the election certification, especially if Trump invoked the Insurrection Act to politicize the military in an antidemocratic way. But by January 4th people at the DOJ became more and more worried about what could happen on the 6th.
Moreover, the Capitol police chief said they wouldn’t need the D.C. National Guard. Again, though, no one was aware of Trump’s plans, or how he would add fuel to the fire on the 6th.
The D.C. National Guard had around 340 active service members on the 6th, spread across three locations: a Quick Reaction Force in Maryland, several traffic points in D.C., and then a group at the Armory for a 3pm replacement shift. By the morning of January 6th, the D.C. Guard’s Ground Commander became more and more alarmed: “I could see different people with Kevlars on, with bulletproof vests on. You know, they’re all kitted up and they’re wearing different patches and colors. And I said, ‘Well, this crowd is definitely different…’” (735).
At 2:12pm the Ground Commander received news of shots at the Capitol and began working on a plan for the redeployment of the Guard. By 2:50pm the Ground Commander confirmed that at least 135 Guard members were ready to go — he just needed approval to deploy them. Earlier, around 1pm, the Capitol police chief told a ranking official at the Guard that “we are getting overrun on the West Front by thousands. We need the National Guard now” (736).
However, Generals at the Pentagon weren’t giving the go-ahead, partly due to optics and partly to wait and gather more information. They also said they didn’t have the authority to authorize the National Guard since Trump hadn’t provided it. In the end, the wait for the green light was three hours and 19 minutes.
During that time, Pence called several times to check in on the Guard’s delayed response; Trump didn’t call even a single time. The Generals did think about giving the authorization on their own, given the circumstances, but they dragged their feet. There was also some miscommunication in terms of who was doing what, which also caused delays.
Finally, a little after 5pm, one of the Generals gave the go-ahead. By the time the D.C. National Guard arrived at the Capitol, most of the fighting was over.
In their assessment, the Select Committee notes that, “while the delay seems unnecessary and unacceptable, it was the byproduct of military process, institutional caution, and a revised deployment approval process” (749) and seemingly not from any kind of intentional delay.
Appendix 3: The Big Rip-Off: Follow the Money
The Trump campaign used fundraising emails and text messages to amplify the Big Lie and shore up donations to “Stop the Steal.” Trump and the Republican National Committee (RNC) raised over $250 million, mostly from small-dollar donors. However, most of this money didn’t fund challenges to the election, but rather to fund Trump’s other endeavors. The Select Committee calls this the Big Rip-off because the RNC knew that the Big Lie wasn’t true, yet they continued to fundraise with it.
The Trump campaign and the RNC sent out hundreds of fundraising emails after the election — as many as 25 emails a day. The emails used inflammatory language because they knew it was an effective way to raise money.
During the 2020 election, the Trump campaign and the RNC worked together to raise funds through the “Trump Make America Great Again Committee (internally referred to by its acronym TMAGAC, which RNC officials pronounced ‘T-Magic’)” (771). TMAGAC’s focus was fundraising through small-dollar donations. They operated out of an office building in Arlington, Virginia. There were several smaller teams under the digital team, such as a copy team, a text message team, a data team, etc. Although team members consisted of staff from both the Trump campaign and the RNC, they shared the same goal: Raise as much money as possible.
The copywriting process worked like an assembly line, and a lot of the drafts were based on things Trump said or tweeted. That’s because “the goal was to make the millions of recipients of aggressive, hyperbolic fundraising emails believe that the emails were coming from President Trump himself” (773). One senior staffer likened it to giving Trump supporters “red meat” (773).
Before becoming copy, drafts had to be approved by an Approvals Group which included members of the legal, communications, and research departments. The Approvals Group was in place partly to ensure that the copy was accurate and true. However, the Select Committee found that “members of the Approvals Group typically engaged only in cursory reviews of the fundraising messages and did not review substantive claims of election fraud for accuracy” (774).
Zach Parkinson, the Trump campaign’s Deputy Director of Communications and Research Director, said the election fraud statements weren’t checked for accuracy because “most political text messages and fundraising emails are political rhetoric, and so a lot of them don’t necessarily require fact checking” (774). Again, this was the head of the research team admitting that he wasn’t fact checking, but “simply looking for messaging consistency” (775). Even the Trump campaign’s legal representative wasn’t checking these claims for accuracy.
Thus, while many on the TMAGAC digital team thought the Approvals Group served as a guardrail, they weren’t doing so at all. That’s how email drafts full of false claims got approved and sent to millions of Trump’s followers. This process helped to spread the Big Lie and make it appear as if it had validity.
The Trump campaign had three of its best fundraising days on November 4th, 5th, and 6th — the three days immediately after the election. Jared Kushner was particularly interested in tracking how much money the TMAGAC team was raising.
Prior to election night, TMAGAC discussed three main messaging options: 1) To claim victory, 2) To say they were waiting on election results, or 3) To claim that Democrats were trying to steal the election. The copy team received approval for this third option even before it was election night.
From November 4th to January 6th, TMAGAC sent out hundreds of emails to millions of people. They used fake claims of voter fraud to make it seem like the election was fraudulent. Both Trump and the RNC told TMAGAC to continue to fundraise after the election. And sure enough, the inflammatory language was effective at raising funds. Trump’s tweets and statements were the basis for TMAGAC’s copy. One again, Trump was the source of the lies.
The RNC knew that Trump was lying. Yet, as the Select Committee notes, “they walked as close to the line as they dared — making several changes to fundraising copy that seemingly protected the RNC from legal exposure while still spreading and relying on President Trump’s known lies” (778). The RNC tried to have it both ways. Nor did the RNC try to distance themselves from Trump. In the end, they approved emails making claims they knew were false, all because it helped raise a lot of money.
TMAGAC kept sending emails in late December. “These emails came after December 14, 2020, the day electors from each State met to cast their votes for President and Vice President. These emails came after Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell made it clear that he accepted the electoral college’s certification of Biden’s victory. These emails came after President Trump and his allies had lost all but one lawsuit challenging the election. None of this made a difference to TMAGAC” (781). When asked why they kept sending emails saying that Biden was an illegitimate President, TMAGAC’s chief copywriter said it was because the emails were effective at raising money.
One junior copywriter named Ethan Katz raised objections to Trump’s lies and was fired three weeks after the election. When the Select Committee interviewed Katz’s boss to ask why Katz had been fired, the supervisor said she wasn’t sure.
TMAGAC used Salesforce to send out their emails, which Salesforce did willingly until January 6th. An anonymous Salesforce employee who works at the “abuse desk” (to prevent fraud and abuse stemming from Salesforce accounts) noticed as early as July 2020 that the RNC’s emails contained more and more violent and inflammatory rhetoric that was in direct violation of Salesforce’s Master Service Agreement. However, senior people at Salesforce ignored this employee’s objections. “Salesforce very obviously didn’t care about anti-abuse,” this person said (783).
The first three days after the election, TMAGAC raised over $100 million for the “Official Election Defense Fund.” However, there was no “Official Election Defense Fund.” TMAGAC’s head copywriter said it was all “a marketing tactic” (784). It was such a successful tactic that TMAGAC raised over $250 million after the election.
So, where did all that money go? Well, “on November 9, 2020, President Trump created a separate leadership PAC called Save America that allowed him to keep millions of dollars raised after the election and spend it with very few restrictions in the future” (784). With all that money now in the Save America PAC, this meant Trump could use the money on personal expenses, like travel and hotel stays. In fact, Save America “spent no money on recount and election-contest related expenses” (784).
Reporters began to question the Trump campaign about the misleading, bait-and-switch nature of these emails. However, Trump’s communications team simply ignored the questions and never responded, as any answer would only serve to highlight the misleading emails.
Millions of Save America dollars have been given to companies with ties to Trump’s associates. The appendix gives several examples of this, but here’s just one: “Hudson Digital LLC has received payments totaling over $420,000, all described as ‘Digital consulting.’ No website or any other information or mention of Hudson Digital LLC could be found online. Though Hudson Digital LLC is registered as a Delaware company, the FEC Schedule B listing traces it back to an address belonging to Dan and Catherine Scavino” (785). Dan Scavino was the White House Deputy Chief of Staff. Many other Trump associates have ties to organizations that have received hundreds of thousands of dollars from Save America.
Moreover, “from January 2021 to June 2022, Save America has also reported over $2.1 million in ‘legal consulting.’ Many firms perform different kinds of practice, but more than 67% of those funds went to law firms that are representing witnesses involved in the Select Committee’s investigation who were subpoenaed or invited to testify” (786).
As mentioned earlier, these emails not only raised a lot of money, they also helped spread Trump’s false claims about the election. It was only after the attack on the Capitol that TMAGAC decided to stop sending emails about supposed election fraud.
Once the anonymous Salesforce employee was aware of the attack on the Capitol, they blocked the RNC’s ability to send emails through Salesforce. That shutdown lasted a mere five days, at which point senior Salesforce leadership instructed the employee to remove the block on the RNC’s account.
Only a small amount of the over $250 million raised was used to fight the election results. The rest paid for the Trump campaign’s debt or to fund the Save America PAC. Thus, not only did Trump lie to his supporters, he also ripped them off.
Appendix 4: Malign Foreign Influence
One of Trump’s lies about the election was that foreign interference changed Trump votes to Biden votes. However, “no one has ever, either at the time or since, offered any evidence to support Trump’s assertion. On the contrary, amply evidence collected by the Intelligence Community and reviewed by the Select Committee disproves those claims” (806).
That said, there was foreign influence, but it was in terms of the insurrection.
First, the Intelligence Community differentiates foreign interference from foreign influence. “Interference” is a subset of influence which targets the technical aspects of elections, like counting ballots or reporting results. “Influence” is any effort to directly or indirectly affect a U.S. election.
The Intelligence Community’s assessment of the 2020 election found that there was no interference because there were no rigged voting machines or changed ballots. However, Putin did authorize influence operations to hurt Biden, help Trump, further sow divisions in the U.S., and undermine public confidence in the electoral process.
It also wasn’t just Russia. China and Iran also tried to exert influence on the election. It’s easier for these countries to do so because “the growth of the internet and social media use means foreign actors are more able to reach U.S. audiences directly, while the tools for doing so are becoming more accessible” (807).
The 2020 influence was part of a larger, ongoing effort by Putin to worsen divisions and weaken the U.S. at home and abroad. Their main tool in doing so is by pushing disinformation. What was interesting was that the Russian disinformation relied on Trump’s own words. They were basically just pushing what he was putting out. This was similar to a tactic Russia used in the 2016 election as well, particularly their reliance on online trolls to amplify divisive content. (These were the same Russian groups mentioned in the Mueller Report.)
The Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment from 2022 even states: “Moscow has conducted influence operations against U.S. elections for decades, including as recently as the 2020 presidential election. We assess that it probably will try to strengthen ties to U.S. persons in the media and politics in hopes of developing vectors for future influence operations” (809). The Select Committee doesn’t name names, but see: Tucker Carlson, Marjorie Taylor Greene, et al.
Russia relied heavily on proxies who were linked to Russian intelligence but who pushed disinformation to U.S. media outlets and officials close to Trump. It’s near impossible to tell who is a proxy and who is an American exercising their 1st Amendment rights.
Either way, these adversaries try to worsen sociopolitical divisions in America. They also try to make American-style democracy appear less attractive to their own populations. Thus, the January 6th attack played right into their hands.
As the Select Committee so succinctly puts it: “President Trump’s relentless propagation of the Big Lie damaged American democracy from within and made it more vulnerable to attack from abroad” (811).
