An English Major Reads the Mueller Report

An English Major Reads the Mueller Report

Well, friends, I did it. It took me over a month and a half, but I finished all 400 pages of the Mueller Report. I’m exhausted and stunned and exhausted and upset and exhausted. Reading the Mueller Report was both easier and more rewarding than I thought it was going to be while at the same time feeling surprisingly anticlimactic. Today I’m going to give an overview of the report and hit upon some of the aspects that struck me the most. However, the fun doesn’t end there. You see, as I was reading, I took notes. Lots of notes. Notes that summarize the report — often using the language of the report itself. Next week I’ll post the summary for Volume I, and the week after that I’ll post the summary for Volume II. I wanted to create these summaries so that you can get a sense of what the report contains without having to wade through all 400 pages of it, while at the same time providing more detail and depth than a single blog post can provide. So, stay tuned for more Mueller Report action!

First things first: What IS the Mueller Report, exactly? It’s broken up into two parts, with each volume having its own focus. Volume I investigates Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election as well as Russia’s interactions with members of the Trump campaign. Volume II addresses Trump’s actions toward the FBI investigation and the Special Counsel’s investigation, particularly in regard to obstruction of justice. Volume I tops off at 199 pages and Volume II has 181 pages, then there’s around 50 pages of appendices.

One of the things that surprised me the most about the Mueller Report is how readable it is. I knew going in that I wanted to write summaries of the report, and I thought one of my primary tasks when creating these summaries was to condense and translate some difficult legal language into plain-spoken English. Amazingly, the report is super direct and clear. That’s part of the reason why my summaries use so much of the language from the text itself — there’s no way to make it any more lucid than it already is.

That said, not every part of the report is easy to read. One section of each volume hinges on legal precedent, and these parts were more akin to what I was expecting — dense and slightly incoherent for a non-lawyer like me. Thankfully, both of these sections are relatively short compared to the overall report: roughly 25 pages of Volume I and 20 pages of Volume II. However, I wish I had a better understanding of these sections because they seem very, very important. There’s this quote or idea by David Foster Wallace about boredom, how the truly mind-numbingly dull things often end up being the most important. We tend to gloss over or disregard that which bores us, but it’s within those laws or guidelines or rules that some truly significant information (or power!) resides. These legal-precedent sections of the report feel similarly important, so I do my best to summarize what I can. Still, I can’t help but feel that I’m missing out on so much more.

But let’s get to the good stuff: What did the report find? Let’s start with Volume I. Without a doubt, 100%, for-sure, Russian agencies interfered in the 2016 presidential election. They did so in a few ways. First, they created social media accounts on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Tumblr to pose as Americans and sow discord. They made both right- and left-leaning groups, though as Trump became the presidential nominee their focus shifted to supporting Trump and disparaging Clinton. Then there was the hacking of the DNC and DNCC and the release of those stolen documents through WikiLeaks. Finally, there was the compromising of computer networks for several swing state’s boards of elections. All of this is shocking and scary.

The second half of Volume I examines the links between members of the Trump campaign (and, later, Trump administration) with members of the Russian government. Although there were numerous contacts, and even though both parties could benefit from working together, the Special Counsel didn’t establish coordination with the Russian government. The real key here is “coordination,” a term that requires an agreement — either tacit or explicit — to take actions that are informed or responsive to the other party’s actions or interests. When investigating the evidence through that lens, the Special Counsel did not establish coordination.

Now, it’s important to point out that not establishing coordination is not the same as saying there was no coordination. This is a point the Special Counsel acknowledges themselves: “A statement that the investigation did not establish particular facts does not mean there was no evidence of those facts.” Often, evidence that would help more definitively establish these facts was missing — text messages or emails, for example. Also, the Special Counsel wasn’t able to interview many of the Russians because, well, they’re in Russia and haven’t been arrested and brought to the United States. So although the Special Counsel didn’t establish coordination, that conclusion is drawn from only some — not all — of the information surrounding those interactions.

A couple other thoughts on Volume I: It is more heavily redacted than Volume II. Sometimes this is for “personal privacy,” but most of the time it is listed as “harm to ongoing matter.” Also, in terms of the Special Counsel’s decision to prosecute certain members of the Trump campaign/administration, the issue of “knowingly and willfully” breaking the law comes up. Take, for example, the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower with Don Jr, Paul Manafort, and Jared Kushner. This was a meeting where they were expecting to get dirt on Hillary. What exactly happened in that meeting is unclear, but ultimately the Russians they met with didn’t provide the kind of bombshells that Don Jr, Manafort, and Kushner wanted. There’s a whole legal question as to whether negative information can constitute a violation of a foreign-contribution ban (the answer seems to be: yes, negative information on your opponent is valuable, therefore it can violate the US’ ban on foreign contributions to federal elections), but regardless the Special Counsel didn’t have evidence that Don Jr, Manafort, or Kushner were aware that they were potentially breaking federal laws. Thus, while they may have “willfully” broken the law, they weren’t necessarily “knowingly” doing so. It’s their own incompetence that saves them. (But also, why does one “knowingly” have to break the law in order to be charged for violating that law? Isn’t the “willfully” part more important?)

So that’s Volume I in a nutshell. Volume II investigates Trump’s potential obstruction of justice in regard to the FBI and Special Counsel. I say “potential” here because one of the big, big features of Volume II is the lack of a prosecutorial judgement on the Special Counsel’s part. This is because a sitting President (note: “sitting” is the operative word) cannot be prosecuted. Still, that doesn’t deter the Special Counsel from looking into obstruction of justice, and they lay out their analysis of the evidence. This analysis is damning and more often than not points in the direction of obstruction as opposed to not-obstruction, but they never go far enough to actually charge Trump. So that’s important to keep in mind. In that way, the whole approach to Volume II is different from the approach to Volume I.

Most of the events described in Volume II are already known, but here are some people or events they investigate: Michael Flynn, Comey’s termination, Trump’s efforts to remove the Special Counsel (even going so far as to direct White House counsel Don McGahn to fire Mueller), and Michael Cohen. There’s a lot to Volume II, and so much of it is juicy. If you only have time to read summaries for one of the two volumes, please read the summaries for Volume II.

The last section of Volume II focuses on legal precedent. Trump’s personal counsel wrote to the Special Counsel to bring up statutory and constitutional defenses for Trump’s conduct and why obstruction-of-justice statutes shouldn’t apply to him. However, the Special Counsel does a thorough job dismantling those arguments to prove that legal precedent very much allows them to investigate these charges, even if they can’t prosecute. (“In sum,” they wrote, “an argument that the conduct at issue in this investigation falls outside the scope of the obstruction laws lacks merit.”)

In addition to proving that their investigation is completely valid, the Special Counsel also provided a few suggestions for things that Congress can do to combat a President’s obstruction of justice. For one, Congress could prohibit the offer of a pardon to a witness who may, in exchange, then lie or not testify. Congress also has the authority to limit the President’s power to remove Executive Branch officials. Although that authority might not apply to a cabinet member (i.e. Attorney General), it would apply toward “inferior officers” such as the FBI Director or the Special Counsel. Finally, Congress has the power to define criminal law and apply it to everyone — including the President. Oh, and as one footnote mentions, “A possible remedy through impeachment… would not substitute for potential criminal liability after a President leaves office.” Meaning, let’s put the motherfucker on trial when’s out.

So that’s a brief overview of the Mueller Report and what you can expect to learn over the next couple weeks. Here are some other notes/observations/tips:

  • There are a lot of Russian names in Volume I. A lot. I tried my best to only include the names of really important people. However, if there’s one name you should focus on, it’s Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak. Kislyak has interactions with a lot of Trump officials and is the most likely person to meet the “coordination” qualification, in my opinion. So keep an eye on Kislyak.

  • If you’re curious about reading the Mueller report yourself, start by reading the Introduction and Executive Summaries for both volumes. These are about 10 pages for each volume and give you a really good overview for the report as a whole.

  • Check out Appendix C. For over a year the Special Counsel tried to arrange an interview with Trump. He refused. However, he did agree to answer written questions that were only about Russia-related topics. Unfortunately, Trump’s responses were incomplete and insufficient. For a guy who claimed he had one of the greatest memories of all time, there were over 30 occasions that he “does not recall” or “remember” or “recollect” specific details.

  • In hands-down the weirdest moment of the whole report, Trump was having lunch with Kushner and New Jersey Governor Chris Christie. During the lunch, Flynn called Kushner to complain about what press secretary Sean Spicer had said about him in a press briefing that day. Kushner told Flynn, “You know the President respects you. I’ll get the President to send out a positive tweet about you later.” It’s this next detail that seems straight out of The Godfather: “Kushner looked at the President when he mentioned the tweet, and the President nodded his assent.”

  • Trump believed that Mueller had a few conflicts of interest and therefore shouldn’t serve as the Special Counsel. Many people — including Steve Bannon — told Trump that these supposed conflicts were “ridiculous and petty,” but one claim in particular cracks me up: Mueller disputed some fees relating to his membership at a Trump golf course in Northern Virginia. See, in October 2011 Mueller resigned his family’s membership because they lived in DC and were unable to make full use of the club in Sterling, VA. Mueller asked if he could get a refund for a portion of his initial membership fee that was paid in 1994. About two weeks later, the club responded that Mueller would be placed on a waitlist to be refunded on a first resigned / first refunded basis. The footnote with this information notes: “The Muellers have not had further contact with the club.”

  • As I mentioned, one of Trump’s more glaring acts was to ask Don McGahn to fire the Special Counsel. McGahn refused, instead deciding that he would resign. Trump later tried to play this off, saying that he didn’t want McGahn to fire Mueller, only to bring these conflicts of interest to the Department of Justice’s attention. In assessing this evidence, the Special Counsel wrote: “[McGahn] called his lawyer, drove to the White House, packed up his office, prepared to submit a resignation letter with his chief of staff, told Priebus that the President had asked him to ‘do crazy shit,’ and informed Priebus and Bannon that he was leaving. Those acts would be a highly unusual reaction to a request to convey information to the Department of Justice.”

  • McGahn didn’t end up resigning that day, and during a later conversation in the Oval Office, Trump questioned him about taking notes. "What about those notes? Why do you take notes? Lawyers don’t take notes. I’ve never had a lawyer who took notes.” As the Special Counsel wrote, “McGahn responded that he keeps notes because he is a ‘real lawyer.’” Then-chief-of-staff John Kelly described the meeting as “a little tense.”

  • I only found one typo in the entire 400-page report! It’s on page 147 of Volume II. The line reads: “At the time, Cohen’s understood” instead of “Cohen understood.” Still, very impressive that I didn’t find any other errors.

  • You may have noticed already that the report doesn’t often refer to Trump by his name. It’s most often “the President” rather than “Trump.” I think this is an interesting choice, if it’s a choice at all — in all likelihood, maybe they had to use “the President.” But if it WAS a choice, I love it. If there’s one thing Trump loves most, it’s his name. Why else would he speak in the third-person? And here, “the President” strips him of his name. That said, in my summaries, I used “Trump” rather than “the President” because I think it’s important to separate the actions of this one individual from his title.

  • After Trump asks McGahn to fire the Special Counsel, there’s a noticeable shift in the amount of evidence available to Mueller and his team. That’s because Trump became aware that he was under investigation and began to communicate with his own personal counsel. Don McGahn and the White House counsel don’t offer attorney-client privilege with the President (a point McGahn told Trump several times before it seemed to sink in), thus any communication between Trump and McGahn was not confidential. However, after that whole debacle, then Trump only communicated with personal counsel, which, like with the missing emails and texts from Volume I, means that we’re not seeing the full picture.

  • The reason I said finishing the report felt anticlimactic is because Trump is still president, and so much more shit continues to go on. For as damning as the report is — both for Trump and Russia — it serves more as a deeply detailed summary of what happened between 2016 and early 2019. There isn’t any closure because we, the public, are still waiting for closure. So even though I finished the report, things are far from over.

  • Finally, you’ve all heard the line about how the report doesn’t conclude that Trump committed a crime but nor does it exonerate him. That’s strong language, but the rest of the paragraph is equally powerful. Keep in mind that the entirety of the conclusion for Volume II is one paragraph. It reads: “Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw ultimate conclusions about the President’s conduct. The evidence we obtained about the President’s actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were making a traditional prosecutorial judgment. At the same time, if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him.”